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The DEMO preliminary safety and operating design requirements are being defined aiming at obtaining the license with a 
relatively large operational domain.  
The DEMO design approach is being organized, by taking into account the Nuclear Power Plant, ITER and Generation IV 
lessons learnt. Outstanding challenges remain in areas exhibiting large gaps beyond ITER. These require a pragmatic 
approach, especially to evaluate and improve the readiness of technical solutions through dedicated physics and technology 
R&D.  
A system engineering approach is adopted based on an integral plant design analysis, which follows clear defined goals as 
safety, availability and power provision to the grid. This ensures not only the identification of critical interfaces but also the 
margin of possible solutions and, moreover, the definition of target parameters for technical systems to be met in order to 
arrive at a feasible DEMO design. 
The overall DEMO plant design has to be strongly safety and operation-balance of plant (BoP) oriented. 
The paper describes a set of important aspects of safety and BoP that require early attention and a continuous reanalysis at 
any significant design change. This includes: (i) safety provisions required by the coolant options following some reference 
accidents; (ii) tritium inventory limit control considering the substantial throughput; (iii) permeation of tritium through the 
Primary Heat Transfer System; (iv) conditions for a plasma shutdown, (v) pulsed operation and relevant interfaces with the 
grid and BoP systems; (vi) layout of the tokamak building to accommodate Remote Maintenance meeting layout and safety 
criteria. 
Any effort to reduce the complexity of a Fusion Power Reactor design through simplification and rationalization of the 
design and operation of the main systems translates into a more robust plant configuration enlarging safety margins and 
operational thresholds. 
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1. Introduction 
DEMO initial conceptual design studies are being 
conducted in Europe as part of the EU roadmap which 
aims to the demonstration of electricity produced by 
nuclear fusion reactor around the middle of this century. 
DEMO in Europe is the nearest-term reactor design to 
follow ITER, under construction in France, and capable 
of demonstrating production of electricity, operating with 
a closed fuel-cycle and to be a facilitating machine 
between ITER and a commercial reactor [1].   
The aim of this paper is to introduce a few design and 
operational challenges relevant to safety and balance of 
plant (BoP) and to present possible solutions and general 
criteria to minimise and control the complexity of the 
plant aiming at facilitating licensing and improving 
machine availability. 
The preliminary safety and operating design requirements 
have been defined aiming at obtaining the license for 
construction (and license for operation later) with a 
relatively large available operational domain. 
The DEMO design approach is being organized, by taking 
into account the Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) experience 
and the lessons learnt from ITER and Generation IV. 
Outstanding challenges remains in several areas with 
potentially large gaps beyond ITER that need to be 
overcome and that require a pragmatic approach, 
especially to evaluate and improve the readiness of the 
foreseeable technical solutions through dedicated R&D. 
Integrated plant design assessments are essential from the 
early phase to ensure a better integration of engineering 
and operational challenges, safety, power conversion 
aspects and reliability of the power plant: control of 
system interfaces, e.g. primary heat transfer systems 
(PHTS) and plasma-facing-components (PFC), plant 
electrical system (PES) and all active system of DEMO, 
space allocation, layout and hands-on and remote 
maintenance (RM) criteria. 
In other words the overall DEMO plant design have to be 
strongly safety and operation focused (balance of plant-
BoP)-BoP representing a significant culture change 
within the fusion community, which previously 
concentrated mainly to plasma performance optimization. 
The	article	highlights	some important aspects of safety 
and balance of plant (BoP), as the plasma instabilities, the 
radioactive and energy inventories, PHTS and the relevant 
power conversion system (PCS), PES and the tokamak 
layout that require early attention and a continuous 
reanalysis at any significant design change because of 
their impact on licensing or on their dimension and 
relevant complexity.  
The requirements of these systems and structures (PHTS, 
PCS, PES and tokamak building) are challenging 
compared to similar systems in nuclear fission power 
	plants. Different cooling fluids, different temperatures 
and pressures, pulsed operation, formulate extreme 
demands for the design of heat transfer and power 
conversion system (PCS) as well as the very huge and in 
part pulsed electrical power requested by the numerous 
equipment necessary for the fusion reactor (several times 
bigger than the electrical self-consumption of a nuclear or 
conventional power plant) require particular attention in 
the relevant design and continuous interaction with the 
reactor system designers in order to control the dimension 
and feasibility of these systems. 
Any effort to reduce the complexity of DEMO through 
simplification and rationalization of the design and 
operation of the main reactor systems will translate into 
beneficial returns on the design of BoP systems and 
finally on the safety and on the operation of the plant. 
 
2. Main Objectives of DEMO  
The overall final objectives of DEMO are a long plasma 
operation time, tritium self-sufficiency and net electricity 
output. In order to reach them two essential objectives are 
necessary to be pursued since the early stage of the design 
and to be verified along the DEMO design development: 
i) a feasible and easy licensing for construction and 
operation, ii) an acceptable availability of the plant. 
 
3. NPP and ITER experience on design, 
construction and operation 
The design, construction and operating experience is 
fundamental for the design, fabrication, operation and 
licensing of a complex nuclear power plant like DEMO.  
ITER is the closest plant, therefore a close attention to the 
ITER design solutions, the results of R&D ongoing, the 
licensing commitments and relevant solutions, the lessons 
learned in each phase of ITER development is considered 
by DEMO designers at the maximum extent, e.g. the 
layout and environmental of the tokamak building, the 
nuclear shielding of critical areas, the identification and 
control of radioactive source terms, the management of 
energy inventories, the safety important classification 
(SIC) of structures, systems and components (SSC) and 
relevant implications. 
DEMO presents a few significant differences in 
comparison to ITER. The main ones are the Breeding 
Blanket with the relevant systems to recover the produced 
tritium, the associated closed fuel cycles, that having to 
deal with a much higher throughput of deuterium (D) and 
tritium (T), should recirculate as much as possible the D, 
T extracted from the vacuum vessel (VV), the complex 
plasma heat transfer and power conversion chain with the 
connection to the grid through its own electrical 
generator. 
Two main concepts for PHTS are presently being studied: 
helium cooled pebble beds (HCPB) and water coolant 
lithium lead (WCLL),. They are of significantly different 
nature, therefore auxiliaries, safety analyses, tokamak 
building, etc., are being defined for each model. 
The operating experience of the NPPs and Generation IV 
is a reference for DEMO for PHTS and PCS and those 
auxiliary systems common in fusion and fission plants, for 
building layout, qualification, maintenance and inspection 
of components. 
DEMO preliminary plant site layout (Figure 1) makes 
basically reference to the ITER one with few adaptations: 
the turbine/generator building, close to the tokamak 
building and to the switchyard as the PCS and PHTS, and 
their auxiliaries, require significant electrical power and 
also the generator has to deliver the power to the grid.  The 
most demanding buildings from design point of view are 
those of the nuclear island: having to perform the 
secondary confinement function, they should resist, 
maintaining the safety function, to all external and 
internal design basis events (DBE). Hosting all the 
radioactive inventories, they have to meet general safety 
principles such as the separation between redundant SIC 
systems, limitation of radioactive and energy inventories 
that can be involved by a single DBE, maintenance and 
human factors requirements. The safeguards buildings 
should host all the other SIC components not contained in 
the nuclear island. Such buildings have to withstand to the 
DBEs in order to protect the SIC components and the 
relevant safety functions. All components non-SIC and 
non-necessary to be close to the torus, should be located 
outside such buildings in order to reduce their volumes, 
the risk of accidents and the radiation dose to the staff. 
  
4. Few Safety and BoP issues and possible 
mitigation 
Eight key design integration issues (KDIIs) that affect the 
whole Plant architecture have been identified [2] and are 
being studied during the DEMO pre-conceptual design 
phase: (i) feasibility of wall protection limiters during 
plasma transients, (ii) integrated design of breeding 
blanket and ancillary systems, (iii) power exhaust taking 
advantage of advanced divertor configurations, (iv) 
tokamak architecture based on vertical blanket segments, 
(v) power conversion concept (direct/ indirect), (vi) 
configuration of plant systems in the tokamak building, 
(vii) feasibility of hydrogen separation in the torus 
vacuum pump and direct recirculation, and (viii) 
development of a reliable plasma operating scenario 
including supporting systems like heating current drive 
(HCD) and diagnostics systems. 
.  
These KDIIs are treated in other papers of the conference 
(see for example [2]).  Below, we discuss briefly the issue 
(v) and some more general aspects affecting safety and 
BoP that are important to consider and control at any stage 
of the project.   
4.1  Plasma instabilities: control and mitigation 
In contrast to existing fusion experiments andITER being 
experimental devices exploiting the plasma physics 
development, 
,  DEMO shall operate with a validated, stable and safe 
plasma scenario [3]. Nevertheless, with the present 
	knowledge, instabilities and plasma disruptions cannot be 
excluded a priori [3]: the present objective is to have a 
plasma disruption rate less than 1 event/fpy. That asks for 
provisions to reduce such risk and also to implement  
mitigation systems to prevent accident sequences [4] 
initiated by them as e.g., a damage on the FW or on DV 
with a possible in-VV loss of coolant accident (LOCA) 
and thereby allowing for a safety demonstration. Because 
of the relevant enthalpy, that accident implies the adoption 
of an expansion volume (EV) or of a VV pressure 
suppression system (VVPSS) for HCPB and WCLL 
respectively to be connected through valves and rupture 
disk to the VV to accommodate the overpressure through 
the extension of the VV volume. That is a complex and 
large system as it is the first static containment barrier 
with capability to control the VV radioactive products, 
including the risk of dust-H/D/T-air explosion [5]. 
Furthermore instabilities and plasma disruption are the 
main contributors to the in-VV dust production that has to 
be measured and maintain below the safety limits.  
 
 
Figure 1. DEMO preliminary plant site layout 
Presently, design provisions are under consideration to 
protect the FW [6]. Further experience on the present 
experiments and that foreseen on ITER might help in 
defining a safe and plasma scenario, as well as an 
effective and reliable way to control instabilities in an 
intrinsic way or through SIC systems. That might reduce 
significantly the inventory of the fluid entering the VV 
and then the dimension of VVPSS or EV. A simplification 
of the EV/VVPSS might come also from the possible 
increase of the design pressure of the VV and its 
extensions (presently limited to only 2 bar because mainly 
of the ceramic windows on few VV connections). The 
qualification tests ongoing in ITER and the R&D on 
material should contribute to this issue.  
 
4.2 Radioactive inventories: minimization and control  
Dust in the VV, tritium in the VV, breeding blanket (BB), 
fuel cycle, PHTS and hot cell and activated corrosion 
products (ACP) in PHTS for the WCLL are the main 
inventories. They change along the operating time and 
their map needs to be identified with accuracy and 
maintained updated at any time up to plasma pulse by 
pulse. Any uncertainty on the inventory figures will 
reduce the operating domain and then the availability of 
the plant.  
Tritium in DEMO is the dominant radioactive inventory 
because of the the huge throughput necessary to sustain 
the fusion reaction (the burning factor of very few % of 
the DT throughput). Very important is the design of a 
system able to recirculate directly the pumped fluid from 
the VV and thereby minimising the throughput of gas to 
be reprocessed to the tritium building (in ITER that is 
100%) [7]. One licensing criterion is posed by the limit of 
chronic releases which in ITER restricts the allowable 
tritium releases to the atmosphere to about 1g/y). The 
tolerated accidental release is of few g/event in ITER) [8] 
and should involve only limited volumes of the buildings 
to avoid the need of a very large detritiation system that 
has implication on several aspects, including auxiliaries 
and space needed. Being a SIC system this needs to be 
redundant and requires to be supplied by the emergency 
diesel generators (in ITER is the biggest electrical load). 
	The inventories and the releases must meet the ALARA 
criterion. 
4.3  Inventories of Energies: control and mitigation 
DEMO presents few significant energies that in accident 
conditions might mobilise radioactive inventory or/and 
challenge some safety functions, e.g. primary or 
secondary confinement systems (i.e. VV or tokamak 
building). The PFC-PHTS coolant, the S/C magnet 
energy, the huge 4 K He cryo-mass and the PFC decay 
heat are the main energies present in the tokamak 
building. The former one can originate, in case of LOCA, 
an overpressure inside the VV above the design pressure 
on several components that have to assure the VV closure 
to warranty the first confinement barrier. The decay heat 
needs to be removed also in case of station blackout). The 
huge magnetic energy is removed through resistances, 
sized considering the S/C coils inductance, in order to 
avoid any risk of electrical arc or short circuit. The energy 
of the huge mass of He at 4K will be controlled through 
isolation valves in order to limit the maximum amount 
releasable into the tokamak building and through a SIC 
quench line to discharge the He into a He recovery tank 
outside the tokamak building. 
The over pressurization of the VV and of its extensions 
following an in-VV LOCA might be limited by assuring 
a more stable plasma (see above) and with the adoption of 
isolation valves (IV) that will reduce the discharged 
coolant inventory. Such valves provide a contribution also 
in case of an ex-VV LOCA limiting the over-pressure of 
the tokamak building and the volume where it has to be 
accommodated. IVs can be installed either on manifolds 
for each sector or on Hot/Cold Legs, on manifolds they 
are more effective but the number of valves is huge (see 
Table 1). 
 
Table 1 In-vessel LOCA-WCLL/VVSPT 1.5 bar (m3) 
Valve Position 5 s closure  10 s closure 
Hot / cold legs 258 (57%) 297 (65%) 
Manifolds 160 (35%) 217 (50%) 
No isolation valves  456 (100%) 456 (100%) 
IV fail close probability is not negligible when many 
valves are installed. Loss of flow is expected to be 
manageable through the fast plasma termination system 
which intervention is fast (e.g. 3s in ITER) without 
damaging PFC. Such SIC system is necessary also for few 
other accidents that may endanger PFC integrity. 
A preliminary design of the decay heat removal system 
(DHRS) foresees a fully redundant active system 
consisting of an emergency heat exchanger (HX) and 
emergency safety grade pump installed in each VV PHTS 
loop in parallel to the main VV PHTS HX and the main 
pump. Like in ITER, the venting of the Cryostat will be 
likely adopted in DEMO, considering it as a redundant, 
diversified and passive DHRS, thanks to the huge 
cryogenic mass of the superconductor (S/C) coils. Table 
2 reports few elements of the active DHRS design power 
determined through an in-VV model describing radiative 
heat transfer and conductive heat transfer between BB and 
VV walls (4/3 MWth for HCPB/WCLL, considering that 
the decay heat at plasma shut down of about 1% of the 
fusion power, decreases fast). From the elements above, 
the DHRS function is not critical, exhibiting several hours 
grace time for intervention. 
Table 2. Heat Exchanger of DHRS  
DHRS HX WCLL  HCPB 
Pth (MW) 3 4 
W (Kg/s) 67,3 89,7 
T in/out DHRS  200/190 200/190 
T in/out CHWS 6/12 6/12 
Pressure drop (bar) 1,5 1,5 
# Active tubes  133 133 
 Length (m) O,820 0,941 
Tube ¾” BWG 18 ¾” BWG 18 
Material Inconel 690 Inconel 690 
 
4.4 Primary Heat Transfer System and Power 
Conversion System 
A preliminary design has been performed [9] as well as 
the localization of the main PHTS systems and 
components. The design is quite challenging for the 
different main circuits (BB, Divertor and VV, others not 
yet designed) and their integration. 
The possibility of a direct coupling of PHTS with PCS, 
with the elimination /or minimization of the energy 
storage system (ESS), identified as one of the eight major 
design issues [2] is under analysis with support from 
nuclear Industry. The aim is to maintain the turbine at its 
nominal speed with the generator synchronized with the 
electrical grid, to provide the minimum steam to the 
turbine necessary to avoid thermal stress. A few technical 
optiona are feasible and currently assessed: an auxiliary 
boiler, a small storage system in PCS and the motorization 
of the electrical generator during the dwell time.  
The PCS, and in case of direct coupling also the PHTS, 
have to face the pulsed operation, the fast increase and 
decrease of fusion power that is not compatible with the 
main components design, particularly the turbine. 
Detailed analyses of the thermal dynamic and hydraulic 
transients are providing the basis for the design solutions. 
A recent reduction of the dwell time to the minimum 
possible (10 minutes), make this proposal interesting. 
4.5 DEMO plant electrical loads 
Another large and complex system is the plant electrical 
system (PES), serving the Tokamak that fundamentally 
can be assimilated to a big “electromagnetic machine”. 
The electrical buildings are 17, 31, 32, 33, 36, 38 of Figure 
1, dedicated to the Magnets, NBI and radiofrequency 
needs. The huge area including buildings 77, 78, 81, 82 is 
the electrical switchyard where DEMO will receive and 
deliver power to two 400-kV transmission lines. It 
includes the compensation of the huge reactive power 
required by the inductive loads and bridge converters. 
	DEMO will require a recirculating electrical power in the 
range of 300-500 MW (almost one order of magnitude 
bigger than the recirculating power of a NPP). This huge 
value, together with that relevant to the pulsed operation 
(Figure 2), necessitates a site close to very well 
interconnected electrical nodes of the EU grid. 
Considering the experience of ITER [10], few mitigation 
solutions are being assessed: i) bigger integration of 
Pulsed Power Electrical Network (PPEN) and  Steady 
State Electrical Network (SSEN), ii) pulsed active power 
of a short duration (e.g. ECH support to plasma 
breakdown) provided by electrical storage systems on-
site, e.g. supercapacitors, iii) reduction of the huge 
reactive power (750 MVAR in ITER) if Active Front End 
thyristor development will be successful [11].  
Figure 2. DEMO preliminary electrical power (HCPB) 
 
4.6 Tokamak building layout and environmental 
conditions 
Two tokamak buildings layout are being developed [12] 
considering the two options for the breding blanket: 
HCPB and WCLL. The building requires large space 
especially for the case of He as a coolant to integrate a 
large number of PHTS loops as well as a large expansion 
volume (tens of thousands m3) in case of an in-VV LOCA, 
the need of large size (>1 m) and long pipes (~9 km) 
transporting high temperature He gas. WCLL production 
of radionuclides N16 and N17 due to interactions of high 
energy neutron with water and resulting radiation doses in 
areas where PHTS is localized, requires shielding and 
accurate layout of the PHTS versus sensible equipment as 
I&C.  
The tokamak building layout takes advantage of the ITER 
design and lessons learnt and of the nuclear Industry 
support. The systems being studied first include cooling, 
particularly for PFC, PHTS, magnets, including feeders 
and quench protection systems, RM, He 4K 
cryodistribution lines, AH, cable trays, diagnostics. Most 
of them, excluding for the time being diagnostics and 
cable trays have been represented on a CAD model: 
considering the DEMO specific preliminary design (e.g. 
cooling system) otherwise on first extrapolation from 
ITER (e.g. feeders). Installation, maintenance and 
inspection criteria are considered. Space reservation is 
considered for huge or numerous systems as diagnostics, 
ventilation and air conditioning, cable trays and I&C 
cubicles. Particular attention is given to layout safety 
criteria as separation or segregation between redundant 
systems, low magnetic and radiation field, pipe whipping 
protection, etc.	
The definition of the layout is being accompanied by the 
first definition of the environmental conditions, 
particularly the magnetic field, the radiation dose rate and 
the temperature, pressure, humidity. In a fusion reactor 
the accidental conditions affect only the last three 
parameters. 
6.  Conclusions 
DEMO has to produce electrity in a safe and reliable way. 
Therefore ,the entire project must be oriented on safety 
and power provision to the grid. 
The design of all main systems must be advance in a 
progressive way taking into account all the 
interdependencies and considering two major objectives: 
to acquire a nuclear license allowing for a wide operation 
domain and an adequate availability of the plant. The 
safety requirements have been issued since the first phase 
of the project, safety analysis launched from the 
preliminary definition of the main systems: mayor 
accident sequence identified. The relevant deterministic 
analyses on-going, accompanied by the safety 
classification in close discussion with the plant designers, 
are providing important guidelines to the design of 
safeguards and mitigation systems and to the definition of 
the nuclear island. A continuous iteration between 
designers of the main systems and safety allow to 
maintain this objective and also to create the safety culture 
among the designers as it has been often recommended by 
the review Committees of ITER. Identification of source 
terms and their control with an adequate accuracy, 
together with their segregation, is essential to maintain an 
adequate operation domain. 
The preliminary plant site layout has been defined with 
efforts devoted to the most critical aspects as building and 
tokamak. 
A sufficient availability asks for stable, predictable 
plasma and for a simplification of the plants systems as 
much as possible: relevant efforts are ongoing in all the 
system design. 
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